The Hypocrisy of Alden v. Maine: Judicial Review, Sovereign Immunity and the Rehnquist Court by Chemerinsky, Erwin
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
6-1-2000
The Hypocrisy of Alden v. Maine: Judicial Review,
Sovereign Immunity and the Rehnquist Court
Erwin Chemerinsky
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Hypocrisy of Alden v. Maine: Judicial Review, Sovereign Immunity and the Rehnquist Court, 33 Loy. L.A. L. Rev.
1283 (2000).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol33/iss4/3
THE HYPOCRISY OF ALDEN V. MAINE:
JUDICIAL REVIEW, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
AND THE REHNQUIST COURT
Erwin Chemerinsky*
When constitutional historians look back at the Rehnquist Court,
they undoubtedly will say that its most significant changes in con-
stitutional law were in the area of federalism. The Rehnquist Court
has dramatically changed the law in three ways. First, it has nar-
rowed the scope of Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause
and under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.' Second, it has
revived the Tenth Amendment as a limit on Congress's powers to
regulate state governments. 2 Finally, it has granted state govern-
ments much greater immunity from suits.3 Virtually all of these de-
cisions have been by five to four margins, with the majority com-
prised of the five most conservative Justices on the Court: Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and
* Sydney M. Irmas Professor of Public Interest Law, Legal Ethics, and
Political Science, University of Southern California Law School. I want to
thank Cynthia Sandoval for her excellent research assistance and the partici-
pants at the Loyola symposium for their very helpful comments on an earlier
draft of this paper.
1. See, e.g., Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000); Flor-
ida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 119 S. Ct.
2199 (1999); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); see also United States v. Morrison, 169 F.3d 820
(4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999); United States v. Jones, 178
F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 494 (1999).
2. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). But see Reno v. Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666
(2000) (rejecting Tenth Amendment challenge to the Drivers' Privacy Protec-
tion Act).
3. See, e.g., College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999); Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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Thomas.4 The four more moderate Justices-Stevens, Souter, Gins-
burg, and Breyer-have dissented in almost all of these cases.
The ideological split among the Justices in cases involving is-
sues of federalism is not surprising. Throughout American history,
there has been a great ideological divide over federalism. Consis-
tently, conservatives have emphasized states rights in opposing fed-
eral efforts ranging from abolition of slavery to Reconstruction to
progressive legislation protecting workers to the New Deal to the
civil rights movement. Consistently, liberals have argued that con-
cern over state government prerogatives should not preclude desir-
able federal government actions.
What is surprising about the Supreme Court's recent federalism
decisions is how far the conservative majority is willing to go in
protecting state governments from suit to enforce federal law. The
Court has held that even a person with a federal right, including a
property right, is barred from suing a state government for redress. It
also is surprising, indeed I'd say shocking, as to how far the Court is
willing to go in approving complete preclusion of all judicial juris-
diction for individuals with claims against state governments.
A simple example illustrates. Imagine a hypothetical law pro-
fessor who has published a couple of books often used by law stu-
dents. Imagine that a state university decides to reproduce the books
and sell them at less than the publisher's price. Imagine further that
this law professor is saving the royalties for his hypothetical four
children's college education. Under the Supreme Court's 1999 fed-
eralism decisions, the professor cannot sue the state university in
state or federal court for redress.5 The professor can sue individual
state officials, especially for injunctive relief to stop future
4. Decided by this margin were Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, Col-
lege Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board, Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College
Savings Bank, Printz v. United States, Seminole Tribe v. Florida, and United
States v. Lopez.
5. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999) (barring suits against state
governments in state court without their consent); Florida Prepaid Postsecon-
dary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999) (barring
suits against state governments for patent infringement in federal court without
their consent).
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violations, but no suit whatsoever can be brought against the state
university to regain the royalties.
6
Why provide state governments such immunity to violate peo-
ple's rights and avoid paying damages for the injuries they inflict?
In this Essay, I want to examine how the Supreme Court has an-
swered this question. My thesis is that the Court has made a value
choice that protecting the rights of state governments is more impor-
tant than protecting the rights of individuals. I believe that the Court
not only has failed to justify this value choice, but that it disingenu-
ously tries to pretend that it is not making a value choice at all.
Moreover, I contend that this value choice is wrong under the United
States Constitution.
Part I of this Essay argues that the Court's decisions according
state governments immunity from suit can only be understood as a
value choice by the conservative Justices to favor state governments
over individual rights. I will focus especially on Alden v. Maine7 and
argue that the Court's ruling cannot be understood as a product of its
interpretation of the text or history of the Constitution. Indeed, the
Court violates the principles of interpretation that it repeatedly has
professed. The decision is entirely a result of a value choice that the
Court has made to protect state governments at the expense of indi-
viduals.
I focus primarily on Alden v. Maine for several reasons. Until
Alden, it always was thought that according a state Eleventh
Amendment immunity meant that a suit against the state would need
to go forward in state rather than federal court. Alden is a dramatic
change in the law because it means that no judicial forum, state or
federal, is available for suits against state governments. Also, the
Court's Eleventh Amendment decisions at least purport to interpret a
textual constitutional provision. Alden is remarkable because the
Court recognizes a principle nowhere stated in the Constitution, state
sovereign immunity in state court, and allows it to take precedence
over constitutional provisions such as the supremacy of federal law
and due process.
6. The inadequacy of suits against individual officers is discussed infra in
Part HI.
7. 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
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Part II of this Essay then contends that the Court has failed to
justify its value choice. Nothing in the Court's opinion explains why
state immunity is entitled to greater weight under the Constitution
than the rights of individuals.
Part III concludes by arguing that the Court has made the wrong
value choice in light of the Constitution's structure and commitment
to limiting government power. Specifically, I argue that both the
Supremacy Clause and the Due Process Clause explain why states
should not be accorded immunity from suits in their own courts.
The Court's rulings in cases like Alden v. Maine, Florida Pre-
paid v. College Savings Bank, and Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents
will have a profound effect on people's lives. States can inflict great
injuries-by ignoring federal labor laws, by violating copyrights and
patents, by discriminating based on age-and nowhere be held ac-
countable. These decisions are the height of judicial hypocrisy. The
five most conservative Justices who profess the need for judicial re-
straint in cases involving individual rights disregard this completely
in protecting state governments from suit. No matter how much the
Court pretends otherwise, the cases are nothing more than a value
choice to favor state government power over individual rights. This
is a value choice that the Justices never justify and, I believe, cannot
possibly justify.
I. THE HYPOCRISY OF ALDEN V. MAINE:
THE INABILITY TO EXPLAIN THE RULING BASED ON CONSERVATIVE
INTERPRETIVE METHODOLOGY
In recent years, the Supreme Court has consistently rejected re-
quests that it recognize additional fundamental rights under the Con-
stitution. In these cases, the Court has explained the need for judicial
restraint and proclaimed that a right should be judicially protected
only if it is stated in the Constitution's text, clearly intended by the
Constitution's Framers, or supported by an unbroken tradition of
protecting liberty. For example, in Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court
rejected a claim that privacy protects a right for consenting adults, in
their own bedroom, to engage in homosexual activity. Justice White,
writing for the majority, explained that the right could not be
8. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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justified based on the Constitution's text or intent or a tradition of
protection for homosexual activity. Justice White wrote:
The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegiti-
macy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law
having little or no cognizable roots in the language or de-
sign of the Constitution. That this is so was painfully dem-
onstrated by the face-off between the Executive and the
Court in the 1930's, which resulted in the repudiation of
much of the substantive gloss that the Court had placed on
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. There should be, therefore, great resistance
to expand the substantive reach of those Clauses, particu-
larly if it requires redefining the category of rights deemed
to be fundamental. Otherwise, the Judiciary necessarily
takes to itself further authority to govern the country with-
out express constitutional authority. The claimed right
pressed on us today falls far short of overcoming this resis-
tance.
9
More recently, in Washington v. Glucksberg,1 ° the Court held
that there is not a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide.
The Court again professed the need for great judicial restraint in
protecting rights not stated in the Constitution:
By extending constitutional protection to an asserted right
or liberty interest, we, to a great extent, place the matter
outside the arena of public debate and legislative action.
We must therefore "exercise the utmost care whenever we
are asked to break new ground in this field," lest the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed
into the policy preferences of the Members of this Court.
11
The Court said that in deciding whether rights are protected by
the Due Process Clause it follows an established methodology:
Our established method of substantive-due-process analysis
has two primary features: First, we have regularly observed
9. Id. at 194-95.
10. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
11. Id. at 720 (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992),
and citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977)) (citations
omitted).
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that the Due Process Clause specially protects those funda-
mental rights and liberties which are, objectively, "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." Second, we
have required in substantive-due-process cases a "careful
description" of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.
1 2
Compare, then, the approach proclaimed by the Court in these
cases with its method in Alden v. Maine.13 In Alden, the Court held
that a state cannot be sued in state court without its consent. Justice
Kennedy, writing for the majority, declared: "We hold that the pow-
ers delegated to Congress under Article I of the United States Con-
stitution do not include the power to subject nonconsenting States to
private suits for damages in state courts."'
14
Can Alden's protection of rights for state governments be justi-
fied under the methodology followed in cases such as Bowers and
Glucksberg? The text of the Constitution is silent as to whether
states can be sued in state court. The Eleventh Amendment, the only
constitutional provision concerning immunity, provides that federal
courts may not hear suits against states by citizens of other states or
citizens of foreign countries. Although it has been extended to bar
suits against states by their own citizens,' 5 there is nothing in the
Amendment that even hints at precluding suits against states in state
courts. This is not surprising because the purpose of the Eleventh
Amendment was to strike out a specific clause of Article III of the
Constitution, which authorized suits against states by citizens of
other states and citizens of foreign countries that had been relied on
by the Supreme Court in Chisholm v. Georgia.
16
12. Id. at 720-21 (citations omitted) (quoting Moore, 431 U.S. at 503, and
citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) ("so rooted in the tra-
ditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental," and
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," such that "neither liberty nor jus-
tice would exist if they were sacrificed"); also quoting Reno v. Flores, 507
U.S. 292, 302 (1993), and citing Collins, 503 U.S. at 125, Cruzan v. Director,
Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277-78 (1990)).
13. 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
14. Id. at 2246.
15. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (holding that state govern-
ments may not be sued by their own citizens in federal court).
16. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). See John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh
Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L.
REv. 1889, 1926-39 (1983); William A. Fletcher, A Historical interpretation
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Justice Kennedy makes a textual argument by stating that the
existence of states is mandated by the Constitution. He writes:
"[T]he founding document 'specifically recognizes the States as sov-
ereign entities.' ... Various textual provisions of the Constitution as-
sume the States' continued existence and active participation in the
fundamental processes of governance.
', 17
Yet, the fact that the Constitution preserves states as entities
says absolutely nothing about whether states should have immunity
in state court. The Constitution, of course, recognizes the existence
of state governments, but that does not give any indication of the
scope of state power or the existence of state immunity.
Nor can the Framers' intent be used as a basis for providing
states' immunity from suit in state courts. There is no indication that
the Framers discussed the issue of the ability to sue state govern-
ments in state courts either at Philadelphia or at the state ratifying
conventions. There was discussion about the ability to sue states in
federal court, but no known mention of whether states can be sued in
state court. It is notable that in his majority opinion, Justice Kennedy
quotes from Hamilton and Madison as to how states retained their
immunity to suit.18 However, both of these statements were about
whether states could be sued in federal court in light of the language
of Article HI of the Constitution. It is notable that when Justice
Kennedy broadly proclaims "the doctrine that a sovereign could not
be sued without its consent was universal in the States when the
Constitution was drafted and ratified," the authority he cites is Jus-
tice Iredell's lone dissent in Chisholm.1 9
of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of
Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV.
1033, 1063 (1983) (arguing that the Eleventh Amendment only prevents suits
against states based solely on diversity jurisdiction).
17. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2247 (quoting Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44, 71 (1996) and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919 (1997)).
18. See id. at 2248-49.
19. Id. at 2248. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 434-35 (Iredell, J., dis-
senting) ("I believe there is no doubt that neither in the State now in question,
nor in any other in the Union, any particular Legislative mode, authorizing a
compulsory suit for the recovery of money against a State, was in being either
when the Constitution was adopted, or at the time the judicial act was
passed.").
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Justice Kennedy recites at great length the history of the ratifi-
cation of the Eleventh Amendment as showing the commitment of
the Framers to sovereign immunity.20 Yet, all of these quotations
concern the immunity of states to suit in federal court. He assumes
that the states' desire for immunity to suit in federal court means that
the states sought immunity from suit in all courts. This does not nec-
essarily follow. States could have been very distrustful of the new
entity of federal courts, but had no reason for distrust of suits in their
own courts.
Indeed, Justice Kennedy expressly acknowledges that the Fram-
ers were silent on the ability to sue state governments in state courts.
Justice Kennedy invokes this silence as key evidence of the Framers'
intent. He writes:
We believe, however, that the founders' silence is best ex-
plained by the simple fact that no one, not even the Consti-
tution's most ardent opponents, suggested the document
might strip the States of the immunity. In light of the over-
riding concern regarding the States' war-time debts, to-
gether with the well known creativity, foresight, and vivid
imagination of the Constitution's opponents, the silence is
most instructive. It suggests the sovereign's right to assert
immunity from suit in its own courts was a principle so well
established that no one conceived it would be altered by the
new Constitution.21
The problem with this argument is that silence is inherently am-
biguous. Perhaps Justice Kennedy is correct that the Framers were
silent because they thought it obvious that states could not be sued in
state court. Alternatively, maybe they were silent in that they
thought it clear that states could be sued in state court. Most likely,
though, the Framers were silent because the issue did not come up
and they never thought about it. If the interpretive methodology the
Court follows is that set out in cases like Bowers and Glucksberg, a
right should be protected based on the Framers' intent only if it is
clear that is what the drafters desired. Silence is inherently uncertain
and a highly questionable basis for knowing intent.
20. SeeAlden, 119 S. Ct. at 2246-57.
21. Id. at 2260.
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Indeed, as Justice Souter reviews in dissent, there was no con-
sensus among the Framers as to the scope and protections of state
sovereign immunity. Justice Kennedy can invoke a few quotations
to support his position, but in doing so he has to ignore many other
statements rejecting state sovereign immunity. Justice Souter ex-
plained:
There is almost no evidence that the generation of the
Framers thought sovereign immunity was fundamental in
the sense of being unalterable. Whether one looks at the
period before the framing, to the ratification controversies,
or to the early republican era, the evidence is the same.
Some Framers thought sovereign immunity was an obsolete
royal prerogative inapplicable in a republic; some thought
sovereign immunity was a common-law power defeasible,
like other common-law rights, by statute; and perhaps a few
thought, in keeping with a natural law view distinct from
the common-law conception, that immunity was inherent in
a sovereign because the body that made a law could not
logically be bound by it. Natural law thinking on the part
of a doubtful few will not, however, support the Court's po-
sition.22
Finally, in Bowers,23 Glucksberg,24 and other cases the Court
has spoken of tradition being a basis for protecting rights.25 Is there
any tradition of safeguarding states from suit when they are sued in
state court? Justice Kennedy describes none. In fact, on many occa-
sions prior to Alden, the Supreme Court said that a state's sovereign
immunity protected it from suit in federal but not state court.26 Jus-
tice Kennedy explains why these cases never really resolved the
22. Id. at 2271 (Souter, J., dissenting).
23. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 186 (1986).
24. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 702 (1997).
25. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 681 (1996);
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 951 (1992); see also, Erwin
Chemerinsky, Symposium, History, Tradition, The Supreme Court, and the
First Amendment, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 901 (1993).
26. See Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 204-05
(1991); Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 63 (1989); Atas-
cadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238-40 n.2 (1985); Maine v. Thi-
boutot, 448 U.S. 1, 9 n.7 (1980); Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 418-21 (1979).
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question of whether states could be sued in state court. But they
certainly never hinted that states had immunity to suit in state court,
and all assumed that states could be sued there.
Alden v. Maine creates a broad new right for state governments.
Yet, the Court's methodology is at odds with what it professed in
cases such as Bowers and Glucksberg: the text, the Framers, and tra-
dition all are silent about the ability to sue states in state court.
The argument might be made, of course, that states' rights are
different from individual rights. Justice Kennedy makes this argu-
ment in two ways. One is his claim that states had immunity to suit
prior to the ratification of the Constitution and that therefore they
retained this after the Constitution was adopted. Justice Kennedy
writes: "[T]he States' immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of
the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the
Constitution, and which they retain today."
27
However, there are many problems with this argument. First, it
is not at all clear that states possessed such immunity before the Con-
stitution was adopted. As Justice Souter explains in dissent:
The American Colonies did not enjoy sovereign immunity,
that being a privilege understood in English law to be re-
served for the Crown alone; "antecedent to the Declaration
of Independence, none of the colonies were, or pretended to
be, sovereign states,"... Several colonial charters, includ-
ing those of Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and
Georgia, expressly specified that the corporate body estab-
lished thereunder could sue and be sued.28
Second, the argument seems to be that the states had sovereign
immunity, that the states ratified the Constitution, and that therefore
the states kept their sovereign immunity. But long ago, in McCul-
loch v. Maryland,29 the Supreme Court rejected this claim for state
sovereignty. Chief Justice John Marshall declared that "the govern-
ment proceeds directly from the people; is 'ordained and established'
27. Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2246-47 (1999).
28. Id. at 2271 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting 1 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 207, 149
(5th ed. 1891)).
29. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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in the name of the people.",30 Throughout American history, the Su-
preme Court has rejected the idea that states created the federal gov-
ernment and therefore have any power over it. Yet, that is exactly
what Alden creates: states can violate federal law and nowhere be
held accountable.
In fact, in McCulloch, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the
idea that state prerogatives possessed before the Constitution was
adopted could be used to trump the Constitution's requirements.
Chief Justice Marshall wrote:
We cannot comprehend that train of reasoning, which
would maintain, that the extent of power granted by the
people is to be ascertained, not by the nature and terms of
the grant, but by its date .... Their respective powers must,
we think, be precisely the same, as if they had been formed
at the same time. Had they been formed at the same time,
and had the people conferred on the general government the
power contained in the constitution, and on the states the
whole residuum of power, would it have been asserted, that
the government of the Union was not sovereign, with re-
spect to those objects which were intrusted to it, in relation
to which its laws were declared to be supreme?
31
In Gibbons v. Ogden,32 another key early Supreme Court deci-
sion concerning federalism, the Supreme Court went even further
and expressly rejected the idea that states retained powers that they
possessed before ratification of the Constitution. Once more it was
Chief Justice John Marshall who declared:
[R]eference has been made to the political situation of these
States, anterior to its formation. It has been said, that they
were sovereign, were completely independent, and were
connected with each other only by a league. This is true.
But, when these allied sovereigns converted their league
into a government, when they converted their Congress of
Ambassadors, deputed to deliberate on their common con-
cerns, and to recommend measures of general utility, into a
30. Id. at 403.
31. Id. at410.
32. 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
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Legislature, empowered to enact laws on the most interest-
ing subjects, the whole character in which the States appear,
underwent a change .... 33
Third, the primary problem with Kennedy's argument is that it
has a principle nowhere found in the Constitution. Sovereign immu-
nity means that a state cannot be sued for violating the Constitution
and laws made pursuant to it. Alden means that the Constitution is
subordinate to the principle of state sovereign immunity. This is in-
consistent with the Constitution's declaration in Article VI that it,
and laws and treaties made pursuant to it, is the supreme law of the
land.34 Even if Justice Kennedy is correct that states had sovereign
immunity prior to the ratification of the Constitution, the adoption of
the Constitution makes it supreme and does not justify the broad
principle of immunity the Court announces in Alden.
The other argument that Justice Kennedy makes is based on the
structure of the Constitution. The claim is that the holding in Alden
is justified by the structure of the Constitution in a way that the rights
claimed in Bowers and Glucksberg could not be justified. Justice
Kennedy emphasizes the structure of the Constitution in explaining
why states cannot be sued without their consent:
[S]overeign immunity derives not from the Eleventh
Amendment but from the structure of the original Constitu-
tion itself. The Eleventh Amendment confirmed rather than
established sovereign immunity as a constitutional princi-
ple; it follows that the scope of the States' immunity from
suit is demarcated not by the text of the Amendment alone
but by fundamental postulates implicit in the constitutional
design.
35
33. Id. at 187.
34. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, anything in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary not-
withstanding."). It might be argued that the supremacy of federal law is en-
sured in other ways, such as suits by the United States or suits against state of-
ficers. The inadequacy of these mechanisms for ensuring the supremacy of
federal law is discussed in Part III.
35. Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2254 (1999) (citations omitted).
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Again, there are serious problems with this argument. First, the
basis for finding sovereign immunity in the structure of the Constitu-
tion is unclear. Why is it "implicit in the constitutional design?"
The argument seems remarkably like Justice Douglas finding privacy
in the penumbra of the Bill of Rights, something conservatives long
have criticized. 36 The structure of the Constitution is almost exclu-
sively about the federal government. The few provisions concerning
state governments do not say or imply anything about sovereign im-
munity.
Second, Justice Kennedy's structural argument again ignores the
Supremacy Clause. A key structural aspect of the United States
Constitution is its declaration that it, and laws and treaties made pur-
suant to it, is the supreme law of the land.37 How can the supremacy
of federal law be assured and vindicated if states can violate the Con-
stitution or federal laws and not be held accountable? The probation
officers in Alden have a federal right to overtime pay, but there is no
way of forcing the states to meet their federal obligation. College
Savings Bank has a federal patent right that was allegedly infringed
by the State of Florida, but there is no way to hold it liable for patent
infringement. In other words, the states are left free to disregard fed-
eral law.
At oral argument in Alden, Seth Waxman, the Solicitor General
of the United States, quoted to the Court from the Supremacy Clause
of Article VI and contended that suits against states are essential to
assure the supremacy of federal law.38 Justice Kennedy's response
to this argument is astounding. He states:
The constitutional privilege of a State to assert its sovereign
immunity in its own courts does not confer upon the State a
concomitant right to disregard the Constitution or valid fed-
eral law. The States and their officers are bound by obliga-
36. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see also Robert G.
Dixon, Jr., The 'New' Substantive Due Process and the Democratic Ethic: A
Prolegomenon, 1976 BYU L. REV. 43, 84 (stating that in Griswold, Douglas
"skipped through the Bill of Rights like a cheerleader-'Give me a P.. . give
me an R... give me an I... ,' and so on, and found P-R-I-V-A-C-Y as a de-
rivative or penumbral right").
37. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
38. See Alden v. Maine, No. 98-436, 1999 WL 216178 (U.S. Oral. Arg.,
Mar. 31, 1999).
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tions imposed by the Constitution and by federal statutes
that comport with the constitutional design. We are un-
willing to assume the States will refuse to honor the Con-
stitution or obey the binding laws of the United States. The
good faith of the States thus provides an important assur-
ance that '[tihis Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof. . . shall
be the supreme Law of the Land.' U.S. Const., Art. VI.
39
What, then, is the assurance that state governments will comply
with federal law? Trust in the good faith of state governments? Is it
possible to imagine that thirty or forty years ago, at the height of the
civil rights movement, the Supreme Court would have issued such a
statement that state governments simply could be trusted to volun-
tarily comply with federal law? James Madison said that if people
were angels there would be no need for a Constitution, but there
would be no need for a government either.40 The reality is that state
governments, intentionally or unintentionally, at times will violate
federal law. To rely on trust in the good faith of state governments is
no assurance of the supremacy of federal law at all.
My point in this section has been that the Court's decision in Al-
den v. Maine cannot be seen as a product of an interpretive theory
that the Justices in the majority are willing to apply in other constitu-
tional cases, particularly those involving individual rights. Alden's
conclusion that state governments cannot be sued in state court with-
out their consent cannot be justified based on the text, the Framers'
intent, tradition, or the structure of the Constitution.
II. ALDEN AS A VALUE CHOICE TO FAVOR STATE GOVERNMENTS
OVER INDIVIDUALS
That Alden cannot be justified by the methodology used in Bow-
ers or Glucksberg does not show that Alden was wrongly decided.
39. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2266.
40. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 262 (James Madison) (Bantam Classic
ed., 1982) ("If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels
were to govern men, neither external nor internal controuls [sic] on govern-
ment would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be adminis-
tered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable
the government to controul [sic] the governed; and in the next place, oblige it
to controul [sic] itself.").
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Indeed, as one who criticizes the methodology and results in Bowers
and Glucksberg, I cannot maintain that the Court's failure to use their
approaches shows that Alden was incorrect. However, demonstrating
that Alden cannot be justified by the conservative Justices' usual ap-
proach to constitutional interpretation shows that what really oc-
curred in Alden is that the Court's majority made a value choice to
favor state governments over individuals.
Ultimately, the issue in Alden is whether people with federal law
claims against state governments should have a judicial forum avail-
able. The choice that must be made is whether to favor state gov-
ernments' immunity or state governments' accountability. The Court
pretends that it is avoiding making such a value choice by pointing to
external sources as compelling its decision: the text, the historical
background, and the structure of the Constitution. But the above dis-
cussion shows that these sources are equivocal at best and more
likely, strongly supportive of allowing states to be sued. Therefore,
the Court's decision cannot be seen as a value neutral following of a
method of constitutional interpretation. The Court in Alden is mak-
ing a choice to favor state governments over individuals.
Actually, this is true in all of the Court's Eleventh Amendment
decisions. The text of the provision only bars suits against states by
citizens of other states; it says nothing about suits against a state by
its own citizens.4 1 Scholars such as William Fletcher and John Gib-
bons painstakingly reviewed the history of the Eleventh Amendment
and persuasively demonstrated that it was meant to bar only suits
based on diversity jurisdiction against state governments. 42  The
Court's interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment is a choice to pre-
fer state immunity rather than state accountability.
What is particularly troubling is that the Court does not ac-
knowledge or defend this value choice. Instead, the Court makes it
41. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (holding that state govern-
ments may not be sued by their own citizens in federal courts). For a criticism
of Hans, see David L. Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and
the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REv. 61, 70 (1984).
42. See John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign
Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 CoLUM. L. REv. 1889 (1983); William A.
Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow
Construction of an Ajfrmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than a Prohibi-
tion Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REv. 1033 (1983).
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seem that no balancing is occurring at all-that the Court is just dis-
covering state immunity in the history and structure of the Constitu-
tion. The key question which the Court must answer, and never
does, is why, as a matter of constitutional values, state immunity de-
serves precedence over state accountability.
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion, at one point, suggests a
value served by preventing suits against state governments: protect-
ing state treasuries. Justice Kennedy writes:
Not only must a State defend or default but also it must face
the prospect of being thrust, by federal fiat and against its
will, into the disfavored status of a debtor, subject to the
power of private citizens to levy on its treasury or perhaps
even government buildings or property which the State ad-
ministers on the public's behalf.
43
This concern underlies all of the Court's sovereign immunity deci-
sions. Allowing states to be sued in federal or state court means that
states can be held liable and the ultimate cost is to the taxpayer.
This argument, however, is incomplete to support the Court's
holding. The Court also needs to explain why protecting the state
treasury deserves more weight than allowing those injured by state
governments to sue. There is a conflict between two values-immu-
nity to protect state treasuries and the desire to hold state govern-
ments accountable for their violations of federal law. The Court
briefly identifies the former value, but never explains why it is the
more important of the two.
Alden perhaps is best understood as the Court's reviving Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery" under a different guise. In Na-
tional League of Cities, the Supreme Court held that it violated the
Tenth Amendment for Congress to apply the Fair Labor Standards
Act to state and local governments. The Court declared unconstitu-
tional the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act, which re-
quired the payment of the minimum wage, to state and local employ-
ees. The Court found that requiring states to pay their employees the
minimum wage violated the Tenth Amendment because the law "op-
erate[s] to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral
43. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2264.
44. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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operations in areas of traditional governmental functions." 45 The
Court explained that forcing state and local governments to pay their
employees the minimum wage would require that they either raise
taxes or cut other services to pay these costs. 46 The Court said that
this would displace decisions traditionally left to the states and "may
substantially restructure traditional ways in which the local govern-
ments have arranged their affairs."
47
In 1985, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Author-
ity,48 the Supreme Court expressly overruled National League of
Cities. The Court held that applying the Fair Labor Standards Act to
state and local governments does not violate the Tenth Amendment.
Alden effectively overrules Garcia and reinstates National
League of Cities. The Fair Labor Standards Act constitutionally still
applies to state and local governments, but no state can be sued by an
individual for violating it. The same concern for protecting state
treasuries was voiced in both National League of Cities49 and Al-
den.
50
There are several troubling aspects to the Court's approach. By
not actually overruling Garcia, the Court did not eliminate a federal
right that individuals have to be paid overtime pay by all employers,
including state governments. Instead, the Court's decision means
that state employees have a federal right, but no remedy is available
to them. This violates a basic principle of law expressed long ago in
Marbury v. Madison:51 "The very essence of civil liberty certainly
consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the
laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of gov-
ernment is to afford that protection."
52
If the Court had overruled Garcia it would have denied overtime
pay to state employees, but it would not have prevented plaintiffs
with other federal rights from gaining relief from state governments.
Consider a person who has a patent or copyright. The individual
45. Id. at 852.
46. See id. at 849-50.
47. Id. at 849.
48. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
49. See National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 846-49.
50. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2250 (1999).
51. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
52. Id. at 163.
June 2000] 1299
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 33:1283
unquestionably has a federal property right. If the Court in Alden
had ruled that the Tenth Amendment bars application of the federal
Fair Labor Standards Act to the states, a person with a patent or
copyright claim still could sue a state government for infringement in
state court. The Court's decision in Alden means, though, that a per-
son with a copyright or patent infringement claim against a state
government has no forum for redress. The Court's decision in Flor-
ida Prepaid v. College Savings Bank53 means that the suit is barred
in federal court by the Eleventh Amendment. 54 Alden holds that a
state cannot be sued in state court.
Thus, the protection the Court accords state governments in Al-
den is much greater than finding that certain laws cannot be consti-
tutionally applied to the states. Alden means that state governments
can never be sued in state court without their consent. In every
situation where the Eleventh Amendment applies, this means that no
judicial forum is available. Previous to Alden, it was always thought
that a finding of Eleventh Amendment immunity meant that the case
had to be brought in state rather than federal court. Alden's impact is
that no judicial forum, federal or state, will be available. What is so
disturbing about Alden is that the Court has made a basic value
choice to favor state governments over individuals and never justi-
fied, and hardly even acknowledged, that it was making such a
judgment.
III. WHY THE COURT'S VALUE CHOICE WAS WRONG:
STATE ACCOUNTABILITY IS MORE IMPORTANT
THAN STATE IMMUNITY
Thus far, I have argued that whether state governments should
be accorded sovereign immunity in their own state courts cannot be
determined by the text, the Framers' intent, history, tradition, or the
structure of the Constitution. Each of these sources can be invoked
equally persuasively on either side of the question. A value choice
must be made as to which is more important-state immunity or
state accountability.
53. 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999).
54. See id. at 2205.
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In this section, I argue that the Supreme Court has made the
wrong value decision in preferring state immunity over state ac-
countability. There are two reasons why states should be amenable
to suit in their state courts: ensuring the supremacy of federal law
and providing due process for those who are deprived life, liberty, or
property. I argue that each of these outweighs the interest in pro-
tecting state treasuries from damage awards.
A. The Supremacy of Federal Law
The federal Fair Labor Standards Act applies to the states and
gave the probation officers in Alden v. Maine55 a federal right to
overtime pay.56 Similarly, in Florida Prepaid v. College Savings
Bank,57 the plaintiff, College Savings Bank, has a federal patent and
all of the rights accompanying it, including against state govern-
ments.58 If state governments can disregard federal law, then no
longer is federal law supreme. If state governments cannot be sued,
how can the supremacy of federal law be assured? As discussed ear-
lier, Justice Kennedy's explicit answer in Alden was that trust in the
good faith of state governments is sufficient to ensure the supremacy
of federal law.59 This hardly seems an adequate assurance of the su-
premacy of federal law. Indeed, state governments are encouraged
by the Supreme Court's decisions to violate federal law because they
know that they cannot be sued for violations. For instance, not long
ago, I was preparing material for a speech at a state judicial confer-
ence and told the state coordinator that I would get appropriate copy-
right releases. He responded that after the Supreme Court's deci-
sions in June, they don't worry about that any more because they
know they can't be sued. Broad immunity often will be interpreted
as license to violate federal laws.
There are two steps to the argument that the supremacy of fed-
eral law justifies allowing state governments to be sued. First, the
supremacy of federal law is a basic constitutional value and
55. 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
56. See id. at 2246.
57. 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999).
58. See id. at 2201.
59. See Alden, 119 U.S. at 2266. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying
text.
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outweighs the desire to protect state treasuries. Second, damage suits
against state governments is essential in order to ensure the suprem-
acy of federal law.
The importance of ensuring supremacy of federal law was ar-
ticulated by the Supreme Court long ago in McCulloch v. Mary-
land.6 ° Chief Justice John Marshall declared: "This great principle
is, that the constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof are
supreme; that they control the constitution and laws of the respective
States, and cannot be controlled by them." 6' Chief Justice Marshall
elaborated on the importance of ensuring supremacy of federal law:
If any one proposition could command the universal assent
of mankind, we might expect it would be this-that the
government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is
supreme within its sphere of action. This would seem to re-
sult necessarily from its nature. It is the government of all;
its powers are delegated by all; it represents all, and acts for
all .... The nation, on those subjects on which it can act,
must necessarily bind its component parts. But this ques-
tion is not left to mere reason: the people have, in express
terms, decided it, by saying, "this constitution, and the laws
of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance
thereof," "shall be the supreme law of the land," and by re-
quiring that the members of the State legislatures, and the
officers of the executive and judicial departments of the
States, shall take the oath of fidelity to it. The government
of the United States, then, though limited in its powers, is
supreme; and its laws, when made in pursuance of the con-
stitution, form the supreme law of the land, "any thing [sic]
in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary not-
withstanding."
62
The question is whether suits against state governments are nec-
essary to ensure the supremacy of federal law. There are two alter-
native mechafiisms that might be pointed to as adequate substitutes
for suits against the states. One is the possibility of the United States
government suing the state. State sovereign immunity does not bar
60. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
61. Id. at 426.
62. Id. at 405-06.
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suits by the United States government against state governments.
63
For example, the United States Department of Labor may sue state
governments for violating the federal Fair Labor Standards Act and
could bring suit on behalf of the probation officers in Maine. The
argument is that this is sufficient to ensure the supremacy of federal
law.
At the very least, this argument applies only in the relatively few
instances in which the federal government can bring suits on behalf
of individuals against state governments. For the vast majority of
federal laws, the federal government has no authority to sue on be-
half of individuals. For example, when the federal government
brought suit on behalf of individuals who were institutionalized by
state governments and whose rights allegedly were being violated,
the federal courts ruled that the federal government lacked stand-
ing.
64
Consider the rights of the patent holders in Florida Prepaid.
The federal government has no authority under federal law to sue on
behalf of the individual patent holders. Nor would the federal gov-
ernment be accorded standing if it brought suit. If the patent holders
cannot sue in federal or state court-and the Supreme Court's recent
decisions mean that both forums are not available-then there is no
way to ensure the supremacy of federal patent law over the states.
Moreover, even in the limited areas where the federal govern-
ment may sue on behalf of individuals, this is insufficient to ensure
the supremacy of federal law. Federal agencies, such as the Depart-
ment of Labor, have very limited prosecutorial resources. They are
not able to sue on behalf of very many individuals whose federal
rights have been violated. In all other instances, state governments
are able to get away with violating federal law; in all of these situa-
tions, federal law no longer is supreme over the states. States
knowing of the unlikelihood of federal suit can violate federal law
with little chance of being held accountable. Practically, states are
supreme over federal law.
63. See, e.g., United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-41 (1965);
United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 646 (1892).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Mattson, 600 F.2d 1295, 1299-1300 (9th Cir.
1979); United States v. Solomon, 563 F.2d 1121, 1125-26 (4th Cir. 1977).
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The other mechanism for holding states accountable is suits
against state officers. Although state governments cannot be sued,
state government officials can be sued.65 State officers can be sued
for injunctive relief66 and state officers can be sued for money dam-
ages to be paid out of their own pocket.67 Although such suits are
important in ensuring the supremacy of federal law, they are inade-
quate and do not replace the ability to sue state governments.
Injunctive relief obviously can prevent future violations, but it
does nothing to provide redress for past infringements. The proba-
tion officers in Alden can sue for an injunction to ensure that they are
paid overtime in the future, but that does nothing to provide them a
remedy for the prior violations of their rights under the federal Fair
Labor Standards Act. College Savings Bank might get an injunction
against state officers to protect their patents from future infringe-
ments by the State of Florida, but that gives them no remedy for past
wrongful actions. For all of the states' violations of federal law that
occurred prior to the injunction, and for many reasons they could be
extensive and impose great harm, the supremacy of federal law is
undermined.
Nor are suits against state officers for money damages a substi-
tute for litigation against state governments. Some state officers
have absolute immunity to suits for money damages, such as judges,
prosecutors, and legislators.68 Consider, for example, a claim that
state court judges are systematically violating criminal defendants'
rights, such as by racism in setting bail or by paying criminal defense
attorneys too little to protect defendants' Sixth Amendment rights.
69
Who can be sued in such an instance? The state government cannot
65. See Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 124 (1908). Actually, several ear-
lier cases had held similarly that the Eleventh Amendment did not preclude
suits against state officers. See, e.g., Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 204, 221
(1897); Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 857-59
(1824). The ability to sue state officers in federal court is discussed in ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 411-31 (3d ed. 1999).
66. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 155-56.
67. See id. at 189.
68. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 65, at 500-12 (reviewing cases provid-
ing absolute immunity to these officers).
69. See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 491 (1974) (declaring nonjusti-
ciable a suit contending that the defendants, a magistrate and a judge, discrimi-
nated against blacks in setting bail and imposing sentences).
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be named as a defendant in federal or state courts. State judges can-
not be sued for damages or for injunctive relief because of a federal
law that expressly bars such suits.70 It seems that no suit could be
brought, even though there is an allegation of a serious violation of a
basic constitutional right.
State government officials who do not have absolute immunity
all have qualified immunity, which often makes recovery for viola-
tions of federal law impossible. The Supreme Court has held that
government officials can be held liable only if they violate a clearly
established right that a reasonable officer should know.71 The result
is that injured individuals often have no recourse except to sue the
government entity. Without such litigation, the supremacy of federal
law often cannot be protected. Again, McCulloch v. Maryland is in-
structive:
It is of the very essence of supremacy, to remove all obsta-
cles to its action within its own sphere .... This effect
need not be stated in terms. It is so involved in the declara-
tion of supremacy, so necessarily implied in it, that the ex-
pression of it could not make it more certain.
72
B. Due Process ofLaw
A separate reason why state accountability is more important
than state immunity is providing due process of law. If a state gov-
ernment violates a person's life, liberty, or property, due process re-
quires a remedy. As quoted above, this was Chief Justice John Mar-
shall's point when he declared that "[t]he very essence of civil liberty
certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protec-
tion of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.
'73
On many occasions, the Supreme Court has recognized that
the absence of any court, state or federal, raises a serious due process
issue.74 In a long line of cases, the Court has said that because due
70. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, 110
Stat. 3847 (1996).
71. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982).
72. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 427.
73. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
74. See, e.g., Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys., 393 U.S. 233, 243 n.6
(1968) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confu-
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process requires a judicial forum, it would interpret federal laws that
appeared to preclude all jurisdiction as not doing so. For example, in
Johnson v. Robison,75 the Court refused to interpret a statute limiting
review of Veterans Administration decisions in a manner that would
have foreclosed all judicial review.76 The statute provided: "[T]he
decisions of the Administrator on any question of law or fact under
any law administered by the Veterans' Administration providing
benefits for veterans... shall be final and conclusive and no official
or any court of the United States shall have power or jurisdiction to
review any such decision... 77
The Court observed that there would be a "serious question"
about the constitutionality of this provision if it precluded all re-
view.78 As a result, the Court allowed a lawsuit to go forward by a
conscientious objector who performed alternative service and sought
educational benefits that had been denied by the Veterans Admini-
stration.
79
Similarly, in Oestereich v. Selective Service System Local Board
No. 11,80 the Court narrowly interpreted a provision limiting review
of Selective Service decisions. 81 During the 1960s, the Selective
Service Commission retaliated against students involved in anti-
Vietnam War protests by revoking their student deferments and clas-
sifying them as ready for induction. 82 After the federal courts held
that this was impermissible and enjoined the Selective Service
Commission, Congress responded by adopting a statute limiting ju-
dicial review. The Act provided that "[n]o judicial review shall be
made of the classification or processing of any registrant... except
sions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93
COLUM. L. REv. 309, 355-66 (1993) (arguing that the issue of whether there is
a constitutional right to judicial review depends on the underlying substantive
law).
75. 415 U.S. 361 (1974). See also Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603-04
(1988) (refusing to find statute to preclude review of a claim by an employee
of the CIA who alleged that he was fired because he was a homosexual).
76. See Johnson, 415 U.S. at 373-74.
77. 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1982).
78. Johnson, 415 U.S. at 366.
79. See id. at386.
80. 393 U.S. 233 (1968).
81. See id. at 237.
82. See id. at 234-35.
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as a defense to a criminal prosecution.., after the registrant has re-
sponded either affirmatively or negatively to an order to report for
induction ... ."83 The statute appeared to limit challenges to its va-
lidity to two contexts: defenses to a criminal prosecution and habeas
corpus.
The Court, however, allowed an individual to bring suit to chal-
lenge the legality of his reclassification. Justice Harlan, in a concur-
ring opinion, stated that "[ilt is doubtful whether a person may be
deprived of his personal liberty without the prior opportunity to be
heard by some tribunal competent fully to adjudicate his claims."
84
In many other cases as well, the Court emphasized that due pro-
cess requires a judicial forum, and interpreted statutes to permit ju-
risdiction even though they contained language appearing to fore-
close a judicial forum. 85 Those deprived of life, liberty, or property
by a state government must be able to receive due process.
However, the Court's recent sovereign immunity decisions
mean that there will be many instances in which individuals will be
injured without having any judicial forum available. The probation
officers in Maine have a federal property right to overtime pay,86 but
there is no way for them to get due process. College Savings Bank
has a federal property right in its patent, but it cannot get any due
process; federal and state judicial forums are both closed to it.
The argument might be made that protecting state treasuries is
more important than upholding the Due Process Clause. This,
though, seems clearly wrong because the whole point of the Consti-
tution is to limit government power. 87 To allow a government to
deny life, liberty, or property without due process is to negate a basic
constitutional protection and, indeed, the central mission of the Con-
stitution itself. Yet, the Court's recent sovereign immunity decisions
mean that state governments can, in many instances, deprive people
83. Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. app. § 460(b)(3)
(1994).
84. Oestereich, 393 U.S. at 243-44 n.6.
85. See, e.g., McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 491-94
(1991); United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 837-42 (1987).
86. See Roth v. Board of Regents of State Colleges, 408 U.S. 564, 577
(1972) (holding property interest exists if law creates a reasonable expectation
to a benefit).
87. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
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of life, liberty, and property interests and nowhere be held account-
able.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the past, on occasion, I have had my students in Constitu-
tional Law or Federal Courts begin the semester by reading a copy of
both the United States Constitution and the Stalin-era Soviet Consti-
tution. The students always were surprised to see that the latter had a
far more elaborate statement of individual rights. I also had students
read a description of the abuses of human rights during the Stalin era.
The point, of course, was that what makes American law differ-
ent is the availability of judicial review. No court could invalidate a
government action in the Soviet Union. Judicial review is crucial to
enforcing the American Constitution and all American law.
Alden v. Maine is inconsistent with this fundamental precept of
American constitutionalism. The Court has preferred protecting
government abuses of power over the ability of individuals to gain a
remedy for violations of their rights. This is simply an unacceptable
value choice in the American system of government.
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